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We analyse the distribution of household wealth in Spain using the first wave of the 
Spanish Survey of Household Finances, conducted by the Bank of Spain in 2002. We 
study the distribution of the different wealth components and, using inequality 
decomposition techniques, we assess the contribution of each element to overall 
wealth inequality. We find that wealth is more unequally distributed than income, 
while housing wealth is much more evenly distributed than financial wealth. 
Moreover, we identify two groups of wealth components: one disequalizing group, 
which includes financial wealth, whose value and portfolio share increase with 
household wealth; and a second more equalizing one, including housing wealth, 
whose value increases with wealth, but their share in the portfolio does not. Finally, 
we show that differences between age groups do not explain why wealth is much 
more unequally distributed than income. Instead, business and home ownership are 
factors that clearly contribute to explain this feature. 
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The standard indicators of household economic well-being most commonly employed in
welfare distribution analysis are based on money income. However, it is well known that
these indicators ignore certain crucial determinants of families￿welfare. In particular, they
do not consider the important contribution of household wealth to household well-being.1
For instance, as Barrett and McPeak (2006) suggest, assets are the main instrument
households have to insure themselves against risk. Thus, wealth is a source of liquidity
for families in times of economic stress, such as those imposed by unemployment, sick-
ness, or family break-up. Moreover, wealth is a source of consumption, independent of the
income it provides, because assets can be converted into cash and thus can cover imme-
diate consumption needs. Similarly, certain types of assets, like housing, provide services
directly to owners. Therefore, if we want to improve our knowledge of the distribution of
well-being we need to investigate how the wealth dimension of welfare is distributed.
In this paper we study the distribution of wealth in Spain using data from the ￿rst wave
of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (Encuesta Financiera de las Familias, EFF),
conducted by the Bank of Spain in 2002. This is the ￿rst survey that provides detailed
information on the wealth holdings of Spanish households.2 Research on the distribution
of wealth in Spain is scarce and, given the lack of survey data until 2003, mostly based on
wealth tax data. Thus, Naredo (1993) and Arcarons and Calonge (2003) use information
from the Spanish wealth tax (Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio) to analyse the distribution
of the wealth tax base and tax burden and conclude that both these variables are highly
concentrated. More recently, Alvaredo and Saez (2006) estimate top net worth, ￿nancial
wealth and gross income shares for the period 1933-2002 also using personal income and
wealth tax information. These authors ￿nd that the sharp increase in real estate prices
in Spain has been, to a large extent, o⁄set by large stock price increases, leaving overall
wealth concentration relatively stable between 1982 and 2002. Using a di⁄erent approach,
Perdiz (2004) uses data from the Spanish Household Expenditure Survey (Encuesta de
Presupuestos Familiares, EPF) to estimate household wealth using reported income ￿ ows
1Wol⁄, Zacharias, and Caner (2005) analyse the e⁄ect of including wealth and public consumption
in measures of household welfare. They ￿nd that measured inequality increases when imputed rent and
annuities from wealth are added to income. In contrast, including public consumption reduces inequality.
2This survey will be included in the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) database in the future. The
aim of this project, launched in 2003, is to organize and harmonise the existing micro-data on household
wealth. Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, United States, and United
Kingdom are currently contributing to the data base with their national datasets.
2from di⁄erent assets and ￿nds that real estate assets are more equally distributed than
the rest.
To date, only Bover (2005) and Bover et al. (2005) have used the information on
wealth in the EFF database. The ￿rst of these papers reports average and median wealth
holdings of Spanish households as well as asset portfolio composition for di⁄erent house-
hold types. Bover et al. (2005) compare the distribution of wealth in Spain with that in
Italy, United States, and United Kingdom using the relative di⁄erence between the 25th
and 75th percentiles. Their results suggest that the distribution of wealth among Spanish
households is the most equal of the four countries considered.
Despite these results, no formal analysis of the wealth distribution in Spain based
on survey data, has been performed yet. Our goal is to ￿ll this gap. In particular, the
aim of this paper is twofold. First, we use the data from the ￿rst wave of the EFF to
analyse in detail how wealth and its main components are distributed among Spanish
households. We also compare the main features of these distributions with those of the
income distribution. Second, we perform an inequality decomposition analysis in order to
determine the contribution of the di⁄erent wealth components and the di⁄erent population
subgroups to total inequality.
An important goal of our work is to measure the contribution of housing wealth to
overall wealth inequality. During the last decade, Spain has experienced a housing boom
characterised by an extremely high rate of housing construction compared with other
countries: for instance, the number of houses built in 2006 was larger than that in Italy,
France, and Germany together.3 Even so, Spain has experienced one of the largest in-
creases in housing prices among the OECD countries, with an accumulated growth be-
tween 1997 and 2005 around 120 percent. Overvaluation caused by optimism about future
price increases is an important factor underlying this trend in Spain compared with other
countries (OECD, 2005).4 Thus, in 2005, the housing price to income ratio in Spain
was almost twice its long-term average, which was the largest di⁄erence among OECD
countries.
As Bover (2005) reports, housing wealth is the main component of Spanish households￿
portfolio, accounting for more than half of total wealth. Therefore, in a context like the
described above, we believe it is particularly relevant to assess the contribution of this
component to overall wealth inequality, since the house price increase has most probably
3See "The pain in Spain", The Economist April 26th 2007.
4See OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2005/2 , No. 78, December.
3a⁄ected di⁄erent households￿wealth holdings in a very di⁄erent way. Indeed, while access
to housing has become di¢ cult for large groups of the population, especially for young
people, the wealth of homeowners has risen sharply.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the ￿rst wave of the EFF and
the di⁄erent wealth concepts we use in the analysis. Section 3 analyses and compares
the distributions of housing wealth, ￿nancial wealth, total wealth, and income among the
Spanish households. In Section 4 we focus on the distribution of wealth components and
portfolio composition. The results of the inequality decompositions by wealth components
and population subgroups are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 o⁄ers some
conclusions.
2 Data Sources and Methods
The primary purpose of the ￿rst wave of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF)
is to provide detailed information on Spanish households￿wealth holdings.5 The survey
contains information about ownership status and value of the main residence and other
real estate, as well as the amount pending repayment of the loans related to the purchase of
these assets. The EFF also provides the value of the means of transport, jewellery, works
of art, antiques, and businesses owned by any household member.6 Similarly, households
report the value of all deposits and accounts in ￿nancial institutions, listed and unlisted
stocks, mutual and investment funds, bonds, pension plans,7 life insurance, and other
￿nancial assets (such as loans to third parties) owned by household members. Finally,
the EFF also contains information on debts not related to the purchase of real estate,
including its type, motive, and amount pending repayment.
This information is provided for a sample of 5,143 households. An important feature
of this survey is the oversampling of wealthy households. As Davies and Shorrocks (2000)
suggest, this is a necessary condition in order to obtain an accurate picture of aggregate
wealth, given that an important share of total assets belongs to the richest households.
Oversampling in the EFF is based on the individual information of the Spanish wealth
tax collected in 1999.8 As a result of the oversampling, the number of wealth tax payers
5For a detailed description of the methodology used in the ￿rst wave of the EFF see Bover (2004).
6The value of all real assets corresponds to a self-assessed value reported by the head of the household
at the moment of the interview.
7Households are asked to report only the present value of the private pension plans, thus the entitle-
ments to Social Security pensions are not included in this category.
8In 1999, individuals liable to the wealth tax were those with taxable wealth over 104.000 Euros.
4included in the ￿nal sample is 25 times larger than it would be as a result of random
sampling.
In wealth surveys, households usually fail to respond to a complete questionnaire.
Ignoring this problem would induce severe bias in the results, as we expect the probability
of providing a complete answer to be correlated with households characteristics. In the
EFF this problem is corrected using a multiple imputation method9 that provides ￿ve
imputed values for each missing value, which allows for the construction of ￿ve complete
datasets.
The information in the EFF allows us to construct four measures of wealth: total
wealth, net worth (or fungible wealth), housing wealth, and ￿nancial wealth. Total wealth
is de￿ned as the current value of total household assets minus the current value of debts,
where total assets are the sum of real and ￿nancial assets. Real assets are de￿ned as the
sum of the gross value of owner-occupied housing, other real estate, business equities re-
lated to self-employment, collectibles,10 vehicles, and other consumer durables. Financial
assets are de￿ned as the sum of the current value of transaction and saving accounts, total
bonds, stocks, mutual and investment funds, private pension schemes, life insurance and
other ￿nancial assets. Finally, the value of total debt is the sum of principal residence
debt, other real estate property debt, vehicle loans, installment debt, and other debts.
The second measure of wealth, which we will call net worth, is slightly more restricted
and approaches the idea of wealth as a store of value. This measure only considers as
assets those that can be readily converted to cash, which implies that consumer durables
are not included, since these are usually acquired to provide needed consumption services
rather than to serve as a source of potential consumption. Thus, net worth is equivalent
to total wealth minus the value of vehicles and other consumer durables.
The two last measures of wealth correspond to the two main components of net worth:
housing wealth and ￿nancial wealth. Housing wealth is equivalent to the net equity in
owner-occupied housing, that is, the di⁄erence between the gross value and the outstand-
ing debts related to the purchase of the main residence.11 Thus, ￿nancial wealth is de￿ned
as net worth minus housing wealth. Therefore, ￿nancial wealth is the most liquid wealth
9The imputation method is the Federal Reserve Imputation Technique Zeta (Fritz). This is a stochastic
method with a sequential and iterative structure. For more details see Kennickell (1998 and 2000).
10The category of collectibles includes the value of jewellery, works of art, and antiques.
11Notice that mortgage debt is excluded from housing wealth, while debt on consumer durables is
not excluded from net worth. The rationale is that mortgage debt is, in almost all cases, automatically
liquidated when a household is sold. In contrast, consumer loans on a particular item are rarely repaid
when the item is sold and usually exceed the resale value of the item a short period of time after purchase.
5concept, since it only includes those components of wealth that may be immediately
converted in cash.
On the other hand, the EFF also contains data on the di⁄erent sources of income.
In particular, we work through this analysis with household annual gross income (before
taxes and contributions to the Social Security System) in 2001. This variable is the sum
of capital income, wages and salaries, self-employment earnings, unemployment bene￿ts,
private and public retirement pensions, and other transfers received by any household
member.
Lastly, the unit of analysis we use is the household since we are interested in analysing
the inequality of access to wealth across households, rather than the actual consumption
of wealth by individual household members. In contrast with income distribution analysis,
where income is converted to equivalent income due to the consideration of economies of
scale, we implicitly assume that households have perfect returns to scale in the use of
wealth. This is the usual method employed in the wealth distribution literature12 since
there is no standard approach to account for di⁄erent wealth needs across households.
3 The Household Wealth Distribution
3.1 How is wealth distributed?
The primary goal of this section is to determine the main features of the distribution
of wealth in Spain and to compare them with those of the income distribution. In this
analysis we use annual household gross income in 2001, household total wealth, net worth,
housing wealth, and ￿nancial wealth in 2002.13 Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics
of these variables. In 2002 the average net worth of households was about 154,000 Euros,
while the average housing wealth and ￿nancial wealth were around 90,000 and 64,000
Euros, respectively. About 3 percent of the households have zero or negative net worth,
over 18 percent have zero housing wealth, and about 11 percent have zero or negative
￿nancial wealth. These ￿gures are relatively low compared with other countries. Indeed,
12In fact this is the method employed in most country studies. For instance, Kennickell (2000) and Wol⁄
(1996,1998) for the U.S., Brandolini et al. (2004) for Italy, and Morissette et al. (2002) for Canada follow
this approach. In the case of income, we do not consider an equivalence scale, since we are interested
in assessing the correlation between asset holdings and total income ￿ ows to households. For a recent
discussion on measurement issues, equivalence scales, and top and bottom coding practices in wealth
distribution analysis, see Sierminska and Smeeding (2005).
13Income and wealth variables are all expressed in current Euros.
6according to Sierminska et al. (2006), in Italy, Canada, U.S., Finland, and Sweden, the
number of households with zero or negative net worth ranges between 10 and 30 percent.14
Wol⁄ (1998) reports that in 1995 the share of households with zero or negative ￿nancial
wealth in the U.S. was about 30 percent.
Table  1











Mean 172.9 153.9 89.8   64.1 29.3
Median 114.1  95.6 72.0     7.8 22.1
Mean-median ratio     1.5     1.6 1.2 8.3   1.3
Percent of households with zero value     0.0    0.4      18.2    0.9   0.3
Percent of households with negative value     0.3         2.3        0.1  10.2   0.0
Source: Author’s  calculation  using  EFF 2002
It is worth noting that when we consider a more liquid wealth concept, the median
value decreases much more than the mean does, as is re￿ ected in the mean-median ratio.
This ratio, as a standard measure of asymmetry, suggests two things: ￿rst, ￿nancial
wealth is by far the most right skewed of the four wealth variables considered; second,
except for housing wealth, wealth is more positively skewed than income. This feature
can be viewed even more clearly by looking at the estimated density functions15 presented
in Figure 1. The income distribution displays most of the population mass around the
median value. In particular, the share of households with income between half and one
point ￿ve the median income is greater than 50 percent. In contrast, in the case of net
worth, housing wealth, and ￿nancial wealth this percentage is around 38, 39, and 14
percent, respectively. Thus, for housing wealth a substantial fraction of density mass lies
close to zero. Indeed, there are marked spikes around this value that re￿ ect the relatively
larger fraction of the population with zero housing wealth (18.2 percent).16 Financial
14These authors report some preliminary results of the wealth distribution for Italy, Canada, U.S.,
Finland, and Sweden based on the LWS database.
15We present a non-parametric estimation obtained using the adaptive Kernel method. In particular,
we applied this method with the Gaussian Kernel function. For more details, see Silverman (1986). The
density function of total wealth is not included as it is almost identical to the density of net worth.
16Notice that net worth clearly has two modes: one close to zero and a second one around the median
value. This result must be explained by the two modes in the distribution of housing wealth, given
7wealth displays more population mass below zero (about 10 percent) than housing wealth
and also presents large and sparse right-hand tail re￿ ecting the existence of households
that accumulate a disproportionate amount of this type of wealth.
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The results from this graphical analysis already provide some insight about wealth
and income inequality. To analyse this issue, Table 2 shows the percentage shares held by
various percentiles of wealth and income. In 2002 the richest 10 percent of families ranked
by net worth, owned more than 40 percent of total net worth while, the share held by the
bottom quintile was less than 1 percent. The most liquid assets are the most concentrated
ones. Thus, in the case of ￿nancial wealth, the richest 20 percent owned more than 85
percent, whereas the bottom 40 percent owned a negative amount of this type of wealth.
In contrast, housing wealth was less concentrated than ￿nancial wealth. Thus, the top 1
percent of households ranked by housing wealth accumulated only 6 percent of the total
wealth. The Gini index of net worth is 0.6. Compared with other countries included in
the LWS, this value is similar to that of Italy, while it is signi￿cantly lower than that of
Canada, Finland, Sweden, and United States, where the index is above 0.7.17 Finally,
the large share of net worth it represents. These modes clearly re￿ ect the existence of two groups of
households: homeowners and non-homeowners.
17Notice that when there are negative values, as in the case of wealth, the Gini index may be greater
than one, since the Lorenz curve may lie below the horizontal axis.
8the ￿gures reveal that wealth is much more concentrated than gross income.18 Indeed,
the bottom 20 percent in terms of income accumulated about 5 percent of total income,
which is larger than for any of the wealth measures considered. In comparison, the richest
20 percent accumulated about 47 percent of total income, wich is rather low compared
with the ￿gures for wealth.
Table 2










Percentage share held by
Bottom Quintile 1.9 0.9 0.2 -1.5 5.1
2nd Quintile 7.4 6.6 8.3 0.5 10.1
3rd Quintile 13.2 12.5 16.3 2.8 15.2
4th Quintile 20.8 20.6 24.9 11.9 22.6
Top  Quintile 56.7 59.4 50.4 86.3 47.1
Percentage share held by
Bottom 40% 9.4 7.5 8.4 -1.0 15.2
Next  50% 50.5 50.0 59.3 31.8 54.3
Top 10 % 40.2 42.6 32.3 69.2 30.5
Top 10-5% 12.1 12.5 12.2 16.2 11.1
Top   5-1% 15.6 16.4 14.0 25.5 12.8
Top  1% 12.4 13.6 6.2 27.4 6.7
Gini Index 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.4
Coefficient of Variation 5.0 5.6 1.0 13.3 1.0
p75/p25 3.9 4.5 4.2 56.0 2.8
p90/p50 3.1 3.3 2.5 20.9 2.6
p10/p50 0.1     0.02        0.0 -0.01 0.3
S80/S20 29.9 66.0 252.0 -57.6 9.2
Source: Author’s  calculation  using  EFF 2002
Note:  For the computation of percentile shares households are ranked  according to the
          correspondent variable.
In order to check the robustness of the previous results to the way inequality is mea-
sured, Figure 2 presents conventional Lorenz curves for household wealth and income. As
can be observed, the Lorenz curve for ￿nancial wealth is dominated by the rest of the
distributions as it lies signi￿cantly below the other Lorenz curves. Similarly, the Lorenz
18Note that our measure of income is not adjusted to households needs and that it is before taxes and
contributions to the Social Security System. Results from the 2001 wave of the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) show that the household net income adjusted by the OECD equivalence scale
displays much less inequality than our income variable: the Gini index is equal to 0.3 and the S80/S20
ratio is about 5.
9curve for income clearly dominates the net worth and ￿nancial wealth distributions, as it
lies considerably inside the curves for net worth and ￿nancial wealth. The Lorenz criterion
is not conclusive only when comparing housing wealth with income and net worth.
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3.2 Why is wealth inequality so high?
There is a huge literature that tries to explain the large variance in asset holdings among
households.19 In particular, this literature points to life cycle savings as one of the most
important sources of wealth inequality.20 The theoretical support for this idea is the
basic life cycle model proposed by Modigliani and Brumberg in 1954. According to this
model, individuals will save during their working years to provide for consumption during
retirement, which implies that age is a factor that contributes to wealth inequality. Table
3 shows average wealth for di⁄erent age groups. As can be observed, the cross-section
age-wealth and income pro￿les exhibit the expected hump-shaped pattern. Indeed, for
total wealth, net worth, and ￿nancial wealth, the mean rises steadily with age, reaching
19For an excellent survey of this literature see Davies and Shorrocks (2000).
20There is no general agreement of the relative importance that life cycle savings have on wealth
accumulation. In a recent article, Wol⁄ (1999) ￿nds that savings account for more than one quarter of
household wealth accumulation in the U.S. For a good summary of this issue see Kessler and Masson
(1989).
10its peak in the 55-64 age group, while for housing wealth and income the peak is reached
among those aged 45-54.
Table 3
Age –   Wealth  and  Income  profile








All 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Under 35 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.47 0.94
35-44 0.85 0.81 0.87 0.73 1.04
45-54 1.29 1.29 1.27 1.32 1.31
55-64 1.39 1.42 1.20 1.73 1.20
65-74 0.97 1.00 1.07 0.91 0.76
75 and over 0.75 0.78 0.87 0.67 0.50
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002
Note: Households are classified into age groups according to the age of the
household head.
The relationship between age and wealth holdings is con￿rmed when we look at the age
composition of wealth quintiles. As Table 4 shows, for both housing and ￿nancial wealth,
the bottom part of the distribution is composed mainly of the younger households. In
contrast, the age composition of the top 20 percent is hump-shaped, with middle-aged
households having the largest presence in this group.
Table 4
The age  composition  of Wealth  percentiles,  2002

























26.8 21.2 14.6 11.7 5.8 6.6 18.6 18.9 16.4 15.3 6.2 7.9
26.1 21.5 24.6 22.2 21.6 15.2 30.3 20.8 21.4 21.9 22.7 17.0
18.3 12.2 14.3 23.7 25.0 28.9 23.9 14.9 16.5 18.8 23.1 27.0
10.7 12.6 15.4 15.0 20.5 27.4 18.4 11.4 12.5 14.3 21.8 26.7
10.4 17.2 18.2 18.0 19.1 15.8 8.1 18.8 18.3 18.2 18.4 15.7







All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002
Note:  Households are classified into age groups according to the age of the household head.
11Therefore, there is a clear age-wealth pro￿le that may contribute to an explanation
wealth inequality.21 However, can this pro￿le explain why wealth is so unequally distrib-
uted? Can it explain why wealth is more unequally distributed than income? To study
these issues, we analyse the contribution to inequality of the di⁄erent population sub-
groups. For doing so, we use the Gini index decomposition proposed by Rao (1969).22





2Gk + GB + R
where Gk is the Gini index for group k, GB is the Gini index obtained when every
individual owns the average wealth of the group and R is the residual term. The terms
vk and ￿k are the population share of group k and group k0s mean wealth relative to the
population mean, respectively. The ￿rst two terms clearly correspond with the within-
and between group inequality, whereas the residual term is related to the degree of overlap
between groups (Lambert and Aronson, 1993) Thus, this residual would be zero if the
subgroup wealth ranges do not overlap and it would increase as overlapping increases.
Table 5 shows the results of the wealth and income decompositions. The ￿rst row
shows the results of the decomposition by age group. The ￿gures suggest that di⁄erences
between age groups, while important for explaining wealth inequality, do not explain
why wealth is so unequally distributed. Indeed, the between-group inequality accounts
for a larger share of income inequality than wealth inequality (32 versus 29 percent,
respectively). This result may be due to the Spanish household structure. As Bover
(2007) reports, the percent of individuals in Spain aged 25-29 living with their parents is
large, which may diminish the role of age when explaining wealth inequality.
A similar result is obtained when decomposing by employment status of the household
head. As before, the share of inequality explained by the between-group component
21Recall that the life cycle model is a longitudinal model, which implies that the use of cross-sectional
pro￿les as a test of the life cycle hypothesis may be wrong. Thus, as Shorrocks (1975) pointed out,
because real income typically increases over time, the cross-sectional age-wealth pro￿le may be hump
shaped even though the longitudinal pro￿le rises over time.
22The Generalized Entropy family of indices (I￿) is also used in this type of analysis. However, in the
case of wealth, the indices I0 and I1 cannot be used, given the presence of negative values. Regarding
I2, we decompose it using the method proposed by Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982). Results are not
presented here, but suggest that within-group inequality explains almost all total inequality. This may
be because the I2 index is highly sensitive to the presence of extremely large values of the variable under
analysis, common precisely in the case of wealth.
12is larger for income than for wealth. The ￿gures thus point to business and principal
residence ownership as factors explaining why wealth is more unevenly distributed. Our
results suggest that di⁄erences in wealth holdings between owners and non-owners are
larger than di⁄erences in income. Consequently, inequality between owners and non-
owners accounts for 11 and 24 percent of wealth inequality, while in the case of income
these ￿gures are about 4 and 11 percent, respectively.
Table 5
  Inequality  Decomposition  by  Population  Subgroups
















Age of household head (I) 17.2 28.6 54.2 100 17.0 32.2 50.8 100
Employment status of
household head (II) 27.7 31.5 40.8 100 30.1 32.2 37.7 100
Self-employment (III) 87.0 11.0 2.0 100 93.0 4.4 2.6 100
Homeownership (IV) 69.8 24.7 5.4 100 73.4 11.7 14.9 100
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002
Notes: (I) Households are grouped by the age of the head in six groups: under 35, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75 and over.
           (II) Employment status of household head can be: employee, self-employed, retired, other inactive, or unemployed.
 (III) The category self-employment divides the households into two groups:those where the head is either an owner or a partner in
a family business, or a partner in a non -family business with a role in the management;  and those engaged inother forms of self-
employment (independent professional, sole proprietor of business, and self employed worker) and the remaining households.
 (IV) Homeownership refers to possession of the main residence.
3.3 Income and wealth holdings
A very widespread belief is that families with high incomes will most likely hold an im-
portant amount of wealth, while poor income families are most likely to hold very little
wealth. To conclude this section we analyse this issue by looking at the correspondence
between the distributions of wealth and income. As Table 6 shows, for the four types of
wealth, both mean and median values increase with household rank in the income distri-
bution. The ￿gures suggest that, although wealth and income are positively correlated,
this correlation is rather low. Indeed, the correlation coe¢ cient is always below 0.2 except
in the case of housing wealth, for which it reaches 0.4.23 Similarly, the rank correlations
23Budria et al. (2006) report a correlation between income and wealth in the U.S in 1998 equal to 0.6
and a correlation between wealth and earnings equal to 0.47. They suggest that this low correlation is
driven by retired households, given that they are quite wealthy but their earnings are often zero.
13are always below 0.5. These results point out a large re-ranking between income and
wealth distributions. To assess this feature more formally, the transition matrix based on
the quintile distributions of income and net worth is presented in Table 7.
Table 6
  Mean  and  Median  Wealth by  Income Class with Correlation  Coefficients
( in thousands, 2002 Euros)
Total Wealth Net  Worth Housing Wealth Financial Wealth Quintile
Gross Income
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Bottom Quintile 81.8 61.1 72.8 51.0 55.0 42.1 17.8 2.1
2nd Quintile 112.4 89.7 98.2 75.1 68.4 60.0 29.8 5.0
3rd Quintile 136.0 107.4 117.9 91.6 81.0 72.1 36.9 5.7
4th Quintile 179.3 135.6 157.0 111.9 95.6 84.0 61.4 12.5
Top  Quintile 357.4 225.1 323.0 193.6 149.0 120.0 174.0 53.5
Correlation of  Income with Total Wealth Net Worth Housing Wealth Financial Wealth
Correlation coefficient 0.18 0.17 0.40 0.13
Rank correlation 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.36
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002
We synthesize information in the matrix with the diagonal index24 M(P) proposed
by Shorrocks (1978). The value of this index is 0.88, which re￿ ects a high re-ranking
across the two distributions. Indeed, less than 30 percent of households remain in the
same quintile when the ranking criterion is changed. As usual, there are more movements
within the middle quintiles than in the tails of the distributions. Moreover, there is a
larger correspondence at the top than at the bottom of the distributions: about one third
of the households in the bottom quintile of income remain in the same quintile of wealth,
whereas more than 45 percent of households in the top quintile of income remain in the
same quintile of wealth. These results are similar to those obtained for other countries.
For instance, in the U.S., the mobility index is equal to 0.85, while the correspondence at
the bottom and at the top is around 40 and 45 percent, respectively (Radner and Vaughan,
1987).25 On the other hand, long-range re-rankings are frequent in Spain. Indeed, about
25 percent of the households in the bottom quintile move up to positions above the median
24This index is equal to
n￿tr(P)
n￿1 , where n is the number of percentiles and tr(P) is the trace of the
transition matrix. Notice that when there is no mobility the index is equal to zero, while in the case of
maximal mobility it is equal to n
n￿1.
25These authors construct the same matrix for the U.S. using data for 1979.
14value when changing the criterion. Similarly, around one ￿fth of households in the top
quintile move down to positions below the median when re-ranked. Thus, income and
wealth, while positively correlated, are distributed rather di⁄erently among households.
Table 7
Re-Ranking  in  the Quintile Distribution  of  Income  and  Net  Worth
Net Worth Quintile Income
Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
1 32.7 29.4 19.2 13.7 4.9
2 23.4 25.3 21.2 19.8 10.4
3 22.5 19.8 21.3 21.1 15.4
4 16.1 16.0 23.2 21.9 22.8
5 5.3 9.6 15.3 23.3 46.5
       Mobility index M(P) =  0.88
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002
4 The Components of Household Wealth
In this section we analyse the elements that conform the wealth of Spanish households.
For this goal we classify wealth into three main categories: real assets, ￿nancial assets, and
debts.26 Real assets include the value of the main residence, other real estate, consumer
durables and collectibles, business equity, and vehicles. Similarly, ￿nancial assets are the
sum of the deposits and bank accounts, stocks, pension assets,27 mutual and investment
funds, bonds, and other ￿nancial assets. Finally, the debt component is the sum of the
outstanding debt for the purchase of the main residence and other real estate, vehicle
loans, installment debt, and other debts.28
The ￿rst column in Table 8 shows the relative importance of each component. Tangible
assets constitute the bulk of Spanish households￿wealth as they account for more than 88
26The decomposition of wealth selected is very close to that proposed in the LWS. For detailed infor-
mation on this project see the o¢ cial web page http://www.lisproject.org/lws.htm.
27Recall that pension assets only include the value of the private pension plans and do not include the
entitlements to Social Security pensions. The inclusion of this component may alter the results presented
next signi￿cantly, given the compulsory character of the public pension system. This is an issue left for
further research.
28Other debts include indebtedness to ￿nance household reforms, the acquisition of consumer durables
and collectibles, and indebtedness for the acquisition of either ￿nancial assets, education courses or holiday
packages, and the ￿nance of ceremonies expenses and other consumption expenses.
15percent of total assets. Housing and other real estate are the most important household
assets, accounting for about 50 and 20 percent of assets, respectively. It is worth noting
here the low importance of ￿nancial assets, which represent only around 12 percent of
assets. On the other hand, debt is around 8 percent of total assets. Debts related to the
main residence and to other real estate are the most relevant debt components, accounting
for about 4 and 2 percent of assets, respectively.
As Table 8 shows, important di⁄erences exist in the asset portfolio among wealth
groups. Households in the top decile present a much more diverse asset portfolio than
that of other households. Indeed, other real estate, business equity, and stocks only
have a signi￿cant weight in the portfolio of these households. For the middle class, by
comparison, the main residence is by far the main asset. Thus, its weight in the portfolio
of the middle quintiles ranges between 59 and 71 percent, with its weight reducing as we
move up in the wealth distribution. Vehicles, consumer durables, and collectibles are the
main assets of the households in the bottom decile, as they account for almost 60 percent
of the total assets of this group. For these households, the share of total assets represented
by the main residence is rather low (22 percent) compared with that of the other groups,
whereas the importance of business equities and stocks is almost insigni￿cant (1.3 and 0
percent, respectively).
Figures relative to the ownership of di⁄erent assets contributes to explain di⁄erences
in portfolio composition. In 2002 more than 80 percent of Spanish households owned their
principal residence. This rate is high in comparison with that of other OECD countries.
Indeed, it is larger than that in all the countries included in the LWS, where the percentage
of homeowners ranges between 74 percent in Cyprus to 40 percent in Germany. Regarding
those business equities related to self-employment and stocks, we can see that the owners
of these assets are concentrated in the upper part of the distribution, which con￿rms the
low presence of these assets in the portfolio of the bottom and middle classes. On the other
hand, investment in purchasing the main residence is the main reason of indebtedness, with
more than 20 percent of households having debt for this reason. Most of the households
with this kind of debt are situated in the middle percentiles, whereas indebtedness for
this reason is less frequent in the tails of the distribution.29
29For the bottom tail, this result is coherent with the reduced number of homeowners in this group.
With respect to the upper tail, this may be explained because these households either do not need to go
into debt to purchase a main residence or they have already paid the debt.
16Table 8
The Composition  of Household Wealth  and Percent  of Owners by  Wealth Class
Portfolio composition


























Real Assets 88.3 89.2 89.6 93.7 92.8 90.8 82.9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Principal residence 52.2 21.8 59.6 71.1 69.2 58.7 34.2 81.9 6.4 68.9 95.3 96.7 97.7 95.8
Other real estate 18.6 7.6 6.0 5.6 9.2 17.5 29.2 30.1 2.7 12.1 18.5 29.4 50.4 77.8
Durables and
collectibles 7.6 42.8 16.2 11.2 8.9 6.9 4.7 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Business equity 6.6 1.3 0.5 1.2 1.5 4.3 12.9 11.5 2.1 2.7 6.7 9.0 20.0 35.5
Vehicles 3.3 15.7 7.3 4.6 4.1 3.3 1.9 73.7 46.8 60.6 71.5 80.1 86.9 92.6
Financial Assets 11.7 10.8 10.4 6.3 7.2 9.2 17.1 98,5 92.7 98.8 98.6 99.1 99.6 99.9
Bank accounts 4.6 8.8 8.4 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.1 98.2 91.6 98.7 98.3 99.0 99.4 99.6
Stocks 3.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.8 7.3 12.5 0.4 3.1 5.7 10.9 20.6 44.1
Private pension assets 1.7 1.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.9 2.3 23.1 5.1 8.0 18.5 24.7 36.1 51.0
Investment funds 1.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.9 7.2 0.0 2.3 2.9 6.4 12.5 24.2
Bonds 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 1.9 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.6 4.6 3.7
Other financial assets 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.4 5.4 4.0 3.4 4.4 3.8 5.4 16.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Debts 7.7 48.8 22.2 15.1 8.7 5.4 4.0 43.6 25.1 40.0 51.6 45.3 45.7 45.6
Principal residence 4.3 14.2 16.6 10.8 5.9 2.6 1.2 21.6 3.0 21.9 29.2 26.4 20.3 17.1
Other real estate 1.8 9.4 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.2 6.5 1.0 2.2 3.3 5.3 10.7 20.9
Vehicle loans 0.4 3.9 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 11.6 7.7 11.8 16.0 10.0 12.4 7.4
Installment debt 0.4 8.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.9 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.8 3.4 4.6
Other debts 0.7 12.8 1.8 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 13.6 15.9 11.3 12.3 9.7 8.3 6.5
Net  equity principal
residence
47.8 7.7 43.0 60.3 63.2 56.2 33.0 81.9 6.4 68.9 95.3 96.7 97.7 95.8
Net  equity other real
estate 16.8 -1.8 4.0 4.2 7.9 16.0 27.0 30.1 2.7 12.1 18.5 29.4 50.4 77.8
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002
Note: For the computation of the percentiles households are ranked according to the value of net worth.
Given the observed degree of variance in portfolio composition by wealth group, we
expect assets to be also distributed di⁄erently. As Table 9 shows, real assets are more
equally distributed than ￿nancial assets, as is re￿ ected in di⁄erences in the Gini index
(0.5 versus 0.8). As expected, household￿ s main residence and consumer durables are the
most evenly distributed assets, with Gini index of 0.48 and 0.45, respectively. Also, it is
not surprising at this stage that the main components of ￿nancial wealth are the most
unequally distributed assets. Thus, the top 10 percent hold about 90, 75, and 60 percent
of stocks, business equities, and other real estate, respectively. In contrast, housing debt
is highly concentrated in the middle class. Indeed, for the low and middle classes the
share of housing debt accumulated is larger than their share of gross housing, whereas
the reverse is true for the upper class. As a consequence, the net value of housing is more
17unequally distributed than the gross value, as is re￿ ected in the relative increase of the
Gini index.
Table 9
Gini Index  and  Percent  of  Wealth Component held  by  Wealth Class


















Real Assets 0.51 0.51 0.6 5.5 11.8 17.5 28.3 36.3 100
Principal residence 0.48 0.36 0.2 6.2 15.2 22.0 31.0 25.4 100
Other real estate 0.87 0.57 0.2 1.7 3.4 8.2 25.9 60.6 100
Durables and collectibles 0.45 0.45 3.4 11.6 16.5 19.6 25.2 23.8 100
Business equity 0.97 0.74 0.1 0.4 2.0 3.7 18.1 75.7 100
Vehicles 0.64 0.51 2.8 12.0 15.3 20.3 27.1 22.5 100
Financial Assets 0.80 0.80 0.6 4.8 6.1 10.2 21.6 56.8 100
Bank accounts 0.73 0.73 1.1 10.0 10.5 15.7 27.8 34.9 100
Stocks 0.98 0.87 0.0 0.8 1.1 3.2 6.9 88.0 100
Private pension assets 0.92 0.64 0.5 2.1 5.8 10.4 30.8 50.5 100
Investment funds 0.97 0.62 0.0 2.0 2.3 8.0 24.0 63.8 100
Bonds 0.99 0.56 0.0 1.2 5.4 11.2 47.2 35.0 100
Other financial assets 0.99 0.75 0.4 2.3 6.9 9.0 13.3 68.0 100
Debts 0.80 0.54 3.8 15.7 21.9 18.9 19.5 20.2 100
Principal residence 0.87 0.40 1.9 20.8 27.8 22.7 16.4 10.4 100
Other real estate 0.97 0.48 3.1 6.0 8.6 12.2 23.5 46.7 100
Vehicle loans 0.93 0.42 5.1 18.6 25.0 19.7 20.7 10.9 100
Installment debt 0.99 0.55 13.9 3.0 6.0 14.7 33.0 29.3 100
Other debts 0.95 0.64 10.8 14.2 26.0 15.0 20.3 13.7 100
Net  equity principal
residence
0.50 0.39 0.1 4.9 14.1 22.0 32.3 26.7 100
Net  equity other real estate 0.89 0.58 -0.1 1.3 2.8 7.8 26.1 62.1 100
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002
Note: For computation of percentiles households are ranked according to the value of net worth.
5 The Decomposition of Wealth Inequality
Given that there are assets that are more evenly distributed than others, it is reasonable
to think that each asset has a di⁄erent impact on wealth distribution. The aim of this
section is to determine the contribution of the di⁄erent wealth components to overall
wealth inequality. We start the analysis by looking at the relationship between each
wealth component and total wealth. Figures 3 and 4 show the conditional mean and
the conditional mean share of the wealth components by wealth percentile, respectively.30
30In particular, we present smooth variables obtained by applying kernel-weighted local polynomial
smoothing technique to the original data.
18As the ￿gures show, we can classify assets in two groups: factors whose absolute value
increases both in absolute and relative terms as we move up in the distribution of wealth
(Group I); and factors whose value increases with wealth, while their share in the portfolio
is either a decreasing or non-monotonic function of the level of wealth (Group II).31 Most
assets belong to the ￿rst group. Indeed, only the value of principal residence, vehicles,
other consumer durables, bank accounts, housing wealth,32 and the real assets category
are included in the second one.
In order to determine the contributions of di⁄erent assets to inequality, we employ a
set of decomposition methods commonly used in the income distribution literature. In
particular, we use the Gini variation, the Gini Nested-Shapley decomposition proposed by
Chantreuil-Trannoy (1999), the Gini partial derivative and Gini decomposition proposed
by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), and the Shorrocks decomposition proposed by this author
in his seminal article published in 1982.33
The results of the decompositions are reported in Table 10. A positive (negative) value
indicates that the component is de￿ned as a disequalizing (equalizing) factor. Results in-
dicate that most of the assets are de￿ned as disequalizing factors by every decomposition
rule. In fact, this is the case for all assets included in Group I. Among these, business equi-
ties, other real estate, and stocks are found to be the most disequalizing assets, contribut-
ing to increase wealth inequality up to 68, 27, and 21 percent, respectively. Regarding
assets included in Group II, their contribution depends on the particular decomposition
considered. Thus, according to the equal Shapley, the Gini, and the Shorrocks decomposi-
tions34 the principal residence, vehicles, other consumer durables, bank accounts, housing
wealth, and the real assets category are de￿ned as factors that promote wealth inequality.
The reason is that the absolute value of each of these assets increases with wealth, which
implies a positive correlation with total wealth. Instead, the zero Shapley decomposition,
the Gini partial derivative, and the Gini variation de￿ne them as factors that contribute
to wealth equality because their portfolio share is larger in poor and middle households
than in households at the top of the distribution. Therefore, if we accept a "pure" relative
31Since it is not possible to construct ￿gures including every wealth factor, we have selected, factors
from each group that allow construction of the clearest possible ￿gures.
32Recall that housing wealth is just the net value of the principal residence.
33We present two versions of the Nested-Shapley decomposition: the zero wealth decomposition and
the equalized wealth decomposition. For a detailed description of these and the other decomposition rules
see the Appendix.
34The results of these decompositions are very similar to those reported in Brandolini et al.(2004), who
decompose wealth inequality in Italy using the Gini and Shorrocks decompositions. To the best of our
knowledge this is the only work that applies decomposition techniques to wealth inequality.
19Figure 3. Mean wealth component by Wealth percentile
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Figure 4. Mean wealth component share by Wealth percentile
(Variables expressed as percentage of Total Wealth)
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20notion of inequality, we can conclude that these wealth components contribute to reduce
wealth inequality in Spain.35 In particular, principal residence and housing wealth are the
assets that most promote wealth equality, since according to some decompositions they
contribute to reduce inequality up to 54 and 31 percent, respectively.
Table 10
  Inequality  Decomposition  by  Wealth  Component














Real Assets 74.4 75.8 87.3 -102.5 -8.4 -498.5
Principal residence 5.0 2.5 42.4 -54.6 -14.2 -51.2
Other real estate 6.4 3.1 27.5 2.2 7.3 4.5
Durables and collectibles 1.0 1.5 4.3 -34.9 -3.9 -4.5
Business equity 62.0 68.5 11.2 4.4 4.0 3.2
Vehicles 0.0 0.1 1.9 -19.6 -1.7 -1.9
Financial Assets 24.5 24.4 15.3 175.2 2.7 2.1
Bank accounts 4.4 0.6 4.1 2.5 -0.9 -1.3
Stocks 4.4 21.3 5.8 40.6 2.4 2.3
Private pension assets 4.1 0.2 2.3 28.2 0.4 0.3
Investment funds 4.0 0.2 1.7 34.3 0.5 0.4
Bonds 3.8 0.0 0.3 34.8 0.1 0.0
Other financial assets 3.9 2.1 1.1 34.7 0.3 0.2
Debts 1.0 0.2 -2.6 27.3 5.7 3.8
Principal residence debt 1.0 0.0 -0.3 18.4 4.4 3.1
Other real estate 0.8 0.2 -1.9 1.5 0.0 -0.3
Vehicle loans -0.4 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.4 0.4
Installment debt -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -1.1 0.2 0.1
Other debts -0.2 0.0 -0.1 4.1 0.7 0.6
Total 100 100 100 100
Net  equity principal
residence 4.9 2.5 42.0 -23.3 -9.8 -31.1
Net  equity other real estate 6.2 2.9 25.6 31.0 7.4 5.3
Source: Author’s calculation using EFF 2002.
35There is a correspondence between the absolute and relative criteria and uniform additions criterion
proposed by Morduch and Sicular (2002). According to these authors, an inequality decomposition
satis￿es the uniform additions property if it registers negative (positive) contributions to overall inequality
for any positive (negative) wealth component that is equally distributed. Every relative decomposition
rule satis￿es this property, while no absolute decomposition does.
216 Conclusions
The development of household surveys of assets and debts in the last decades has allowed
economists to analyse how wealth and its main components are distributed among house-
holds. However, the ￿rst wave of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances, conducted by
the Bank of Spain in 2002, is the ￿rst household survey available in Spain for performing
wealth distribution analysis. In this paper we use data from this survey to analyse how
wealth and its components are distributed among Spanish households. We also investi-
gate the degree of contribution of housing wealth and ￿nancial wealth to overall wealth
inequality.
Similar to results for other countries, we ￿nd that household income is much more
evenly distributed than net worth. However, the main two components of net worth are
distributed di⁄erently. Financial wealth is much more unequally distributed than housing
wealth. A high concentration of the most liquid assets exists in the upper wealth classes.
Thus, certain assets such as stocks, business equity related to self-employment, and real
estate di⁄erent from the main residence are almost exclusively held by households at the
top of the wealth distribution. In contrast, housing wealth is more evenly distributed.
This type of wealth is especially important for households at the middle of the distribution
as it accounts for a large share of their asset portfolio. According to this result, we also
￿nd that housing debt is held mostly by the middle class. As a consequence, the net value
of housing is distributed more unequally than the gross value.
Regarding the contributions to wealth inequality, we identify two groups of wealth
components. One group of disequalizing factors, including ￿nancial wealth, whose value
and portfolio share increase with the level of household wealth; Instead, housing wealth
and other components can be considered as equalizing components, at least from a pure
relative inequality approach, because, even though their value increases with wealth, their
share in the portfolio tends to be smaller in rich households. Indeed, while these compo-
nents are de￿ned as equalizing factors by some decompositions, components in the ￿rst
group are de￿ned as disequalizing factors by every decomposition rule we present. Finally,
we show that business and home ownership are factors that contribute to explain why
wealth is more unequally distributed than income, while di⁄erences between age groups
do not. We suggest this result is due to Spanish household structure. Thus, the percent of
individuals in Spain aged 25-29 who live with their parents is large, which may diminish
the role of age when explaining wealth inequality.
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267 Appendix
7.1 Inequality decomposition by wealth factors
The ￿rst measure we present is the equalized version of the Nested-Shapley decomposition
proposed by Chantreuil-Trannoy (1999). According to the Nested-Shapley method the
contribution of any factor to overall inequality is equivalent to the expected marginal
impact when the component is eliminated, where the expectation is computed over all
the possible elimination sequences.36 Regarding the elimination process, in the equalized
version this is carried out by removing the inequality from the component. Thus, the
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k is the equal Shapley contribution of component k and G(w) is the
Gini index. Next, we report the Shorrocks decompositon proposed in Shorrocks (1982).








sk = 1 (2)
where the numerator is simply the covariance between the wealth component and total
wealth and the denominator is the variance of total wealth.37 Therefore, this rule follows
36An important advantage of this method is that the contributions of the various components do not
depend on the order in which the components are eliminated. However, the Nested-Shapley decomposition
rule violates the principle of independence of the aggregation level. Indeed, this method only satis￿es a
milder independence requirement, since the contribution assigned to a given component is independent of
the level of aggregation of the components of other groups. Thus, for instance, the contribution of any real
asset only depends on how the real assets are grouped and is independent of the level of disaggregation
of ￿nancial assets and debts. For an application of the this method to the American and British income
distributions see Sastre-Trannoy (2002).
37Shorrocks (1982) demonstrated that there exists no unique way to decompose inequality, and that
the contribution of any component to overall inequality can be made to give any value in the interval
(￿1;+1). Finally, he shows that this decomposition rule is the unique satisfying a set of axioms a
decomposition rule ought to obey.
27an absolute criterion when de￿ning the contributions to inequality. Indeed, a su¢ cient
condition for a component to be identi￿ed as a factor that contributes to increase (de-
crease) inequality is that it positively (negatively) correlates with the level of wealth.
We also present the results of the Gini decomposition proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki








sk = 1 (3)
where Rk is the "Gini correlation" between wealth component k and total wealth, Gk is
the relative Gini of component k, and Sk is the component k￿ s share of total wealth.38
As in the previous case, any component whose value is positively (negatively) correlated
with wealth is de￿ned as a disequalizing (equalizing) factor.
The next decomposition we present is the zero version of the Nested-Shapley decompo-
sition. Unlike the equalized version, the elimination process is carried out by completely








sk = 1 (4)
where NShIZero
k is the zero Shapley contribution of component k: The next measure we









where ek represents a percentage change in wealth component k, Sk is the component k￿ s
share of total wealth, Rk is the "Gini correlation" between wealth component k and total
wealth and Gk is the relative Gini of component k. This partial derivative measures the
e⁄ect on the Gini coe¢ cient of an increase in wealth component k of all households equal
to eWk, where e is close to one. Thus, this derivative will be positive (negative) for those
factors that have a positive (negative) contribution to inequality. Notice that according
38As the Pearson￿ s and the rank correlation the Gini correlation ranges between - 1 and +1, where a
value equal to 1 (-1) indicates that the wealth component is an increasing (decreasing) function of total
wealth.
28to expression (5), a positive (negative) correlation between wealth component and total
wealth is not su¢ cient for an element to be assigned a positive (negative) contribution to
inequality. Finally, the last measure we provide is the Gini variation, which re￿ ects the
percentage change in the Gini index when the component is subtracted from total wealth.
Thus, the contribution of each component can be easily expressed as
sk =
G(w) ￿ G(w ￿ wk)
G(w)
(6)
where a positive (negative) value indicates that component k is a disequalizing (equalizing)
factor.
29